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COTTROL'S FAILED RESCUE MISSION
RAOUL BERGER *
An activist remarked in 1983 that replying to Raoul Berger's Government by Judiciary
(1977) has become a "cottage industry."I In fact it has become a rite of passage: neophyte
law professors prove themselves by attempting to rescue legal history from Berger's toils.
Robert Como! is the latest to enter the lists, bearing a shield emblazoned with the bold
motto: "Static History and Brittle Jurisprudence: Raoul Berger and the Problem of
Constitutional Methodology."' His prior efforts to document "American Apartheid"
lead him to read constitutional history through black-colored lenses, a fresh illustration
of Paul Brest's plea to his fellow-activists "simply to acknowledge that most of our writings
are not political theory but advocacy scholarship — amicus briefs ultimately designed to
persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public good." 4 Not satisfied that
my "perceptive" critics, whom he frequently cites, 5 have adequately exploded my history, 6
he repeats their stale canards, taking no account of my detailed refutations,' still less
calling them to the attention of his readers. Yet he charges me with "crucial sins of
* Raoul Berger is a retired Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History at Harvard
Law School.
' Saphire judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 745, 753 (1983).
2 26 B.C.L. REV. 353 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Cottrol].
3 Id. at 376-77,370-71 nn.182-83.
4 Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradiction of Normative Constitutional
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981). Activist writings, Mark Tushnet observes, are "plainly
designed to protect the legacy of the Warren Court." Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and
Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809, 811 (1983).
Aviam Soifer is 'one of Berger's more perceptive critics." Cottrol, supra note 2, at 366. For
light on Soifer's "perceptiveness," sec Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C.L. REv. 427
(1981).
' As Eric Foner wrote of a similar controversy, the criticized thesis "remains important precisely
because a generation of scholars has directed its energies to overturning it." N.Y. Times, May 23,
1982, § 7 (Book Review), at 27, col. I.
Michael Perry considers that they were "generally effective rebuttals" of the historical criti-
cisms. Perry, !nterpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 285
n.100 (1981). "Many of Berger's critics," Cottrol writes, "have been too willing to concede his
essential historical accuracy." Cottrol, supra note 2, at 354 n.12. Cottrol essays to prove them wrong,
but as Sanford Levinson, a fellow activist, wrote of attempts to construct a defense of the modern
cases, "it is naive to pretend that the construction will be an easy task or that we can so easily shed
the view of the Constitution, and its limits, articulated by Berger." Levinson, Book Review, 236
NATION 248, 250 (Feb. 26, 1983) (reviewing R. BERCER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S
OBSTACLE COURSE (1982)).
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omission, the ignoring of evidence damaging to Berger's thesis"; 9 but, as will appear, 1
am more sinned against than sinning.
He maintains that my conclusion that the "minimal guarantees of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 reflected the limited egalitarian agenda of the Thirty-ninth Congress is at
sharp variance with the historical record." 9 He himself notices that
[c]hampions of equal rights were painfully aware of the Civil Right Act's
limitations. The law specified in detail the rights bestowed: the right to own
and dispose of property, the right to make contracts, the right to testify in
court. It was a catalogue of minimal rights long denied blacks in most states.I°
This need not rest on Cottrol's concession. The Supreme Court stated in Georgia v.
Rachel:
The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly indicates that Congress
intended to protect a limited category of rights .... [T]he Senate bill did
contain a general provision forbidding "discrimination in civil rights or im-
munities" preceding the specific enumeration of rights .... Objections were
raised in the legislative debates to the breadth of the rights of racial equality
that might be encompassed by a prohibition so general .... [A]n amendment
was accepted [in House] striking the phrase from the bill."
The deletion was made at the insistence of John Bingham, the draftsman of the four-
teenth amendment, in order to render it less "oppressive,"I 2 noting that "with some few
exceptions every State in the Union does make some discrimination ... in respect of
civil rights on account of race or color."I 3 Hence Bingham stated that the "no discrimi-
nation" sentence "must be stricken out or the Constitutions of the States are to be
abolished by your act . . "I4 This was the Bingham who, Cottrol indicates, "had far
reaching purposes, a desire to bring about a political and social equality far in excess of
what, in 1866, was politically feasible"!I 5 Nowhere does Cottrol pause to ask: why did
Bingham suddenly embrace in the fourteenth amendment what he found "oppressive"
Cottrol, supra note 2, at 365.
Id. at 370.
19 Id. (emphasis added).
" 384 U.S. 780,791-92 (1966). Yet Cottrol states, "[tlhat act, according to Berger, was designed
to confer a specific set of civil rights on the freedmen." Cottrol, supra note 2, at 356 (emphasis
added). He cannot bring himself to acknowledge unassailable facts, a tactic he employs throughout,
IS CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1291 (1866).
' 3 Id.
" Id. Alexander Bickel correctly concluded that "Bingham, while committing himself to the
need for safeguarding by constitutional amendment the specific rights enumerated in the body of
section 1 fof the act], was anything but willing to make a similar commitment with respect to 'civil
rights' in general." Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV, L. REv.
1, 24 (1955).
The chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, James Wilson, explained that the deletion
was made because "some gentlemen were apprehensive that the words we propose to strike out
might give rise to a latitudinarian construction not intended," and to obviate any "construction
beyond the specific rights named in the section." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366-67
(1866).
Cottrol, supra note 2, at 357.
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in the Act; why did what was "politically [un]feasible" in the Act abruptly become
"feasible" in the amendment which was travelling on a parallel track? 15
In fact the framers deemed section one of the amendment to be "identical" with
that of the Act, the purpose of the amendment being to remove doubts as to the
constitutionality of the Act and to protect it from repeal by a subsequent Congress.' 2
From this there was no dissent. "Over and over in this debate," Charles Fairman ob-
served, "the correspondence between Section I of the Amendment and the Civil Rights
Act is noted. The provisions of the one are treated as though they were essentially
identical with those of the other." 8 Harry Flack, a broad constructionist, said of the
amendment, "nearly all said it was but an incorporation of the Civil Rights Bill ....
["There was no controversy or misunderstanding as to its purpose or meaning."'" Con-
temporary with adoption of the amendment, justice Bradley declared in 1870, "the first
section of the bill covers the same ground as the fourteenth amendment . ."20 Yet
Cottrol suggests that the amendment extended "further protection to blacks," 21 taking
no notice of such facts, though they support my view that "the minimal guarantees of
the Civil Rights Act reflect the limited egalitarian agenda of the Thirty-ninth Congress." 22
Those limited goals are confirmed by the framers' denial of suffrage to the blacks.
Cottrol notices that the framers' treatment of suffrage is "an important indicator" of the
framers' "views on the broader question of black equality .... They knew what was at
stake. The right to vote was necessary to protect other rights." 23 There is no need to
recapitulate my documentation for the framers' rejection of a ban on discrimination with
respect to suffrage. 24 Let it suffice that Justice Harlan's own masterly sifting of the
historical facts led him to affirm that the argument for reapportionment flew "in the
face of irrefutable and still unanswered history to the contrary." 25 Commentators agree. 2"
The history of the fifteenth amendment discloses that it was enacted in order to fill the
gap left by the fourteenth. 27 And in a decision contemporary with it, the Supreme Court
16 Bingham was keenly aware that "justice for all is not to be secured in a day." R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT III (1977).
"Historical reconstruction must at least account for the evidence that is discrepant, and must explain
how the rejected testimony came to exist." H. BUTTERFIELD, GEORGE III AND THE HISTORIANS 225
(rev. ed. 1969).
17 R. Berger, supra note 16, at 23. Cottrol's carelessness in stating my position is illustrated by
his statement that "For Berger ... the sole purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to remove
doubts concerning the constitutional legitimacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1866." Cottrol, supra note
2, at 355 (emphasis added).
' 8 Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 44
(1949).
1° H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 81 (1908); for confirmatory
evidence see R. BERGER, supra note 16 at 23.
2° Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House
Co., 15 F. Gas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).
21 Cottrol, supra note 2, at 370.
22 Id.
25 1d. at 370-71.
24 See R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 52-68.
25 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
25 For citations, see Berger, The Activist Legacy of the New Deal Court, 59 WASH. L. REV. 751, 758
(1984).
27 For citations see Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REV.
311, 318-22 (1979).
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declared that before adoption of the fifteenth amendment a State could "exclude citizens
of the United States from voting on account of race . . . [T]he amendment has invested
the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right ...."28
Cottrol does not dispute these incontrovertible facts; instead he muddies the waters
in an effort to expose Berger's "fatally" limited, "historical sensibility too narrowly
focused," vision. 29 Exhibit 1 is my neglect of the grant of suffrage in 1866 to black men
in the District of Columbia. 30 That in no wise detracts from Congress' refusal to interfere
with the Stales' control of suffrage within their own borders, the central issues' Then
Cottrol relies on section two of the amendment, which provides that a State may be
denied representation in the House in proportion to its denial of suffrage on racial
grounds. Cottrol argues that this indicates the "framers' support for black suffrage,"
"clear support for black suffrage."" Manifestly this leaves a State free to discriminate,
albeit at the cost of a proportional diminution of representation. Employing an oft-
repeated shoddy tactic, he states, "Berger argues that the real motive was to insure
Republican hegemony by reducing Southern representation,"" as if this was Berger's
exclusive prepossession. But such were the sentiments of the framers; throughout I rely
on their words, not on my own. It was more important, Senator George Williams of
Oregon, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, candidly avowed, to limit
Southern representation than to provide "that negroes anywhere should immediately
vote." $4 A leading historian of Reconstruction, C. Vann Woodward, wrote that section 2
"was not primarily devised for the protection of Negro rights and the provision of Negro
equality. Its primary purpose ... was to put the southern states" under northern con-
trol." The historical facts bear him out. Thaddeus Stevens, on whom Cottrol relies, said
at the outset that the Southern States "ought never to be regarded as valid States, until
the Constitution shall be amended . . . as to secure perpetual ascendancy" to the Repub-
lican party. 36 The effect of section 2, he said,
will be either to compel the States to grant universal suffrage or so to shear
them of their power as to keep them forever in a hopeless minority in the
national Government . True it will take two, three, possibly five years
before they conquer their prejudices sufficiently to allow their late slaves to
become their equals at the polls. That short delay would not be injurious. In
the meantime the freedmen would become more enlightened, and more fit
to discharge the high duties of their new condition."
21' United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1876).
29 Cottrol, supra note 2, at 354.
30 Id. at 371.
Such examples presumably are meant to bolster Cottrol's charge that "Berger's view of the
history of the fourteenth amendment suffers from an overly narrow focus .... Myopia, unfortu-
nately, is not Berger's sole deficiency as an historian." Id. at 365. He has yet to learn a first rule:
omit the irrelevant.
32 Id. at 358, 372.
" Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
34 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 94 (1866).
as R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 53.
96 1d. at 16.
37 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
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In truth Stevens preferred the reduction of representation to an "immediate declaration"
that "would make them all voters"; he did not "want them to have the right of suffrage"
until they had been educated in "their duties ... as citizens."'
Here as elsewhere Cottrol resolutely shuts his eyes to the historical facts. Blaine of
Maine stated: "The effect contemplated ... is perfectly well understood, and on all
hands frankly avowed. It is to deprive the lately rebellious States of the unfair advantage
of a large representation in this House, based on their colored population, [each voteless
black counted for 3/5 of a voter] so long as that people shall be denied political rights." 39
The joint Committee on Reconstruction reported:
By an original provision of the Constitution, representation is based on the
whole number of free persons in each State, and three-fifths of all other
persons. When all become free, representation for all necessarily follows. As
a consequence the inevitable effect of the rebellion would be to increase the
political power of the insurrectionary States .. .. The increase of represen-
tation necessarily resulting from the abolition of slavery, was considered the
most important element in the questions arising out of the changed condition
of affairs, and the necessity for some fundamental action in this regard
seemed imperative. 4 "
Hence section 2. Whether section 2 was designed to prod the States does not alter the
fact that the framers did not require a halt to discrimination with respect to suffrage. They
left its control to the States — the issue I addressed and Cottrol does not.
1. EQUALITY AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Cottrol's treatment of the fourteenth amendment exhibits the tyro's naive identifi-
cation of his predilections with the aims of the framers, violating the elementary canon
not to "impos[e] upon the past a creature of our own imagining." 4 ' Where Berger "offers
a limited view of the equal protection clause," 12 Cottrol slates in the same breath that
the framers "probably did not plan to abolish school segregation. They did, however,
intend to establish equality of treatment before the law. That was their overriding
purpose . ..." 43 He asserts that they "embraced an ideal of human equality ... an ideal
they successfully wrote into the nation's fundamental law." 14 He cannot perceive that his
"ideal of human equality" is at war with their exclusion of suffrage — the quintessential
right — and of segregation. He sees only what his passionate thesis dictates, turning his
back on the fact that the framers repeatedly rejected proposals to ban ALL discrimination. 45 So
too, he shuts his eyes to the regret expressed by the chairman of the Joint Committee,
Senator William Fessenden, that "we cannot put into the Constitution, owing to existing
" R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 67.
" Id. at 66.
" REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE., No- 112, June 8, 1866, p. 3, reprinted in A. AVINS, THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DEBATES 94 (1967) (emphasis added).
' Richardson & Sayles, Parliaments and Great Councils in Medieval England, 77 L.Q. REV. 213,
224 (1961).
• Cottrol, supra note 2, at 360.
43 Id. at 375.
4 ' Id. at 373.
45 R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 163-65.
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prejudices and existing institutions, an entire exclusion of all class distinctions."46 Stevens,
who early in the session had proposed that "[a]ll laws ... shall operate ... equally on all
persons,•" confessed at the close that he had hoped to remove "every vestige of .. .
inequality of rights ... that no distinction would be tolerated .... This bright dream
has vanished ... we shall be obliged to be content with patching up the worst portions
of the ancient edifice," 43 namely with reinforcing the three Civil Rights Act specifics.
Throughout the debates on the Act, which the framers considered to be "identical" with
the first section of the amendment, they associated equal protection with this narrow
group of rights. One example must suffice: Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio said, "whatever
rights as to each of these enumerated civil (not political) matters the State may confer upon
one race ... shall be held by all races in equality It secures ... equality of protection
in these enumerated civil rights." 49 Cottrol, who accuses me of "crucial sins of omission," of
"ignoring of evidence damaging to Berger's thesis," of "failure ... to explore evidence
contrary to his thesis," 6" nowhere adverts to these devastating facts.
Instead he wanders in an analytical fog. The draftsmen, he notes, knew "almost
nothing concerning equality before the law:" 61
In the vast majority of states, blacks, even if free, were decidedly unequal
before the law .... There was little experience based on a presumption of
legal equality between the races to inform the framers of the fourteenth
amendment of all the necessary implications of the revolutionary doctrine
they were developing. 52
Why were the framers jettisoning experience in favor of a "revolutionary doctrine"? As
Chief Justice Marshall stated, "an opinion which is ... to establish a principle never
before recognized, should be expressed in plain and explicit terms." 63 In fact this attri-
bution of "revolutionary" purpose is a creature of Cottrol's own imagining. Vann Wood-
ward observes that popular convictions "were not prepared to sustain" a commitment to
equality.61 An Illinois Radical, John Farnsworth, stated in the Thirty-ninth Congress that
"'Negro equality' is the everlasting skeleton which frightens some people." 66 Indeed,
wrote David Donald, "the suggestion that Negroes should be treated as equal to white
men woke some of the deepest and ugliest fears in the American mind." 5" Against this
background, attribution to the framers of a "revolutionary" shift from "inequality" is the
rankest wishful thinking,
1"bi. at 164.
47 Id. at 163.
4"Id. at 173. In the teeth of the framers' rejection of a ban on all discrimination, of Fessenden's
and Stevens's regret that the amendment did not ban all distinction, Cottrol urges that "the
amendment's general language was designed to allow for an evolution of approach," in the words
of opponents, "designed to permit broad construction." Cottrol, supra note 2, at 375.
Bi.:RcER, supra note 16, at 170 (emphasis added).
5" Cottrol, supra note 2. at 365, 386.
5 ' Id. at 375.
52 Id. at 376.
5 ' United States v. Burr, 25 F. Gas. 55, 165 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).
C.V. WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF. 	HISTORY 83 (1960).
' 5 Corw. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1866).
"" 1). DONALD, CHARLES SUMNF,R AND THE. RIGHTS OF MAN 157 (1970).
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II. RACISM
Cottrol's comment that "ral significant failure in Berger's discussion of the fourteenth
amendment lies in his treatment of northern racism"" betrays his analytical astigmatism.
As usual, he ignores the factual materials 1 spread before him and sets out on a frolic
of his own. He has yet to learn that it does not suffice to set out an opposing line of
cases, that the judge desires to know how a party reconciles those cases with those of his
opponent. To begin with his own "cases," Lincoln's "very real racism" which "has served
to obscure ... his genuine anti-slavery idealisin." 38 One can be against slavery and yet
remain racist. Cottrol dwells on Lincoln's "cautious growth toward a qualified egalitari-
anism."59 For example, "In 1862, Lincoln informed a black audience that colonization
represented the optimal solution to the American racial dilemma .... By the end of his
career, he had come to the conclusion that colonization was impossible." f" That a pro-
posed "solution" proves impossible does not demonstrate the disappearance of racism.
But let Lincoln speak for himself: a delegation of Negro leaders had called on him at
the White House, and he told them,
"There is an unwillingness on the part of our people, harsh as it may be, for
you free colored people to remain with us .... [E]ven when you cease to be
slaves, ... you are yet far removed from being placed on an equality with
the white race .... I cannot alter it if 1 would. It is a fact." 6 '
And, as will appear, it remained the fact in the Thirty-ninth Congress.
Cottrol stresses "the increased support gained for the abolitionist cause during the
Civil War." 62 Certainly the North became determined to put an end to slavery. But "even
abolitionists," wrote William Brock, an English observer, "were anxious to disclaim any
intention of forcing social contacts between the races ...." 63 Derrick Bell, a black aca-
demician, wrote, "few abolitionists were interested in offering blacks the equality they
touted so highly."64 A recent Reconstruction historian, Philip Paludan, states that racism
was "as pervasive during Reconstruction as after. Americans clung firmly to a belief in
the basic inferiority of the Negro race, a belief supported by a preponderance of
nineteenth-century scientific evidence." 63 The letters and diaries of Union soldiers,
Woodward notes, reveal an "enormous amount of antipathy towards Negroes."" The
undeniable fact is, as David Donald states, that racism "ran deep in the North." 67
" Cottrol, supra note 2, at '366.
" Id.
5"Id.
6" Id. at 367.
6 ' C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 54, at 81.
62 Cottrol, supra note 2, at 368 n.165.
63 W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION 286 (1963).
6.1 Bell, Book Review, 76 COLUSI. L. Rev. 350, 358 (1976). He adds, "the anguish most aboli-
tionists experienced as to whether slaves should be granted social equality as well as political freedom
is well documented." Id.
65 P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITII DEATH 54 (1975). "A belief in racial equality," said W.R.
Brock, "was an abolitionist invention. ... Pio the majority of men in the mid-nineteenth century
it seemed to be condemned both by experience and by science." W. BROCK, supra note 63, at 285.
66 C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 54, at 82.
"7 D. DONALD, supra note 56, at 202.
488	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:481
The fact — if it is a fact — that "anti-slavery advocates [abolitionists] increasingly
became converts to the idea of human equality" 68 does not prove that they had significant
impact on the framers. Woodward found that during the war years "[t]he great majority
of' citizens in the North still abhorred any association with abolitionists . :419 Senators
Fessenden and Grimes, leading Republicans, held the "extreme radicals" in "abhor-
rence."" Senator Edgar Cowan, a Pennsylvania Republican, ridiculed the notion that
the "antipathy that never sleeps, that never dies, that is inborn, down at the very
foundation of our natures" is "to be swept away by ... reading half a dozen reports
from certain abolitionist societies."' The fact is, as David Donald concluded, that
"[m]oderates had to check extreme Radical proposals or be defeated in the districts they
represented." 72 On the basis of a "scale" analysis, M.L. Benedict concluded that the
Radicals "did not dominate Congress during the Reconstruction era,"73 and that "the
nonradicals had enacted their program with the sullen acquiescence of some radicals
and over the opposition of many." 74 Even a fervent radical, Thaddeus Stevens, excoriated
Senator Charles Sumner for raising obstacles to passage of the amendment because it
did not give Negroes the vote,75 facing up to the fact that radicals would have to settle
for less. Only a wishful thinker could extract from such materials the conclusion that
the framers had "an ideal of human equality, an ideal they vigorously defended in
Congressional debate and an ideal they successfully wrote into the nation's fundamental
law. "76
Cottrol chides me for "a too uncritical acceptance of the harsher views American
historians have expressed ...." 77 My views were formed by immersion in the legislative
history of the amendment, the primary source, and the historians I have cited merely
confirm what I found there. Time and again Republicans attested that racism was an
inescapable fact. George Julian, an Indiana Radical, deplored the "proverbial hatred" of
Negroes; Senator Henry Lane of Indiana referred to the "almost ineradicable prejudice,"
Shelby Cullom of Illinois to the "morbid prejudice," Senator William Stewart of Nevada
to the "nearly insurmountable" prejudice, James Wilson of Iowa to the "iron-cased
prejudice" against blacks. 7B These were Republicans bent on protecting the civil rights
of blacks. Senator Henry Wilson, a Massachusetts Radical, stated in the Senate in 1869,
"There is not to-day a square mile in the United States where the advocacy of the equal
rights and privileges of those colored men has not been in the past and is not now
unpopular. "7° While Cottrol pays tribute to "Berger's often prodigious scholarship," he
finds it "is marred by an all too facile consideration of the materials he has developed." 8"
Cottrol, supra note 2, at 373.
"9 C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 54, at 73.
" R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 235.
71 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 393 (1866).
72 I). DONALD, THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 51-52 (1965).
73 M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 27 (1974).
74 Id. at 210.
25 A. AVINS, supra note 40, at 212.
" Cottrol, supra note 2, at 373.
77 Id. at 366.
7 ' R. BERCER, supra note 16, at 13. Senator John Sherman of Ohio stated, "we do not like
negroes. We do not disguise our dislike." Woodward, Seeds of Failure in Radical Race Policy, in NEW
FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 128 (Fl. Hyman ed. 1966).
79 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 672 (1869),
Cottrol, supra note 2, at 386.
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The foregoing materials need no exegesis; they speak for themselves. If "ineradicable,"
"insurmountable," hatred of Negroes does not demonstrate a society hag-ridden by
racism, language has lost its meaning. "What lies beneath the politics of the Reconstruc-
tion period, so far as it touched the Negro," wrote Russell Nye, "is the prevailing racist
policy tacitly accepted by both parties and by the general public."B 1 Cottrol's attempt to
exorcise the racist influence, echoing that of his "perceptive" fellow activist, Aviam Soifer,
simply exhibits a refusal to face up to indisputable facts.
III. STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Another underlying factor that altogether escapes Cottrol's notice was the North's
deep-seated attachment to State control of internal affairs, a factor that weighed heavily
on Reconstruction politics. While the North was determined to balk the return to serfdom
by the South's Black Codes, the eradication of inequality, as Vann Woodward remarked,
required "a revolution for the North as well,"" a revolution, as has been noted, for
which it was utterly unprepared. "The Radical leaders," Flack wrote, "were aware as any
one of the attachment of a great majority of the people to the doctrine of States Rights
the right of the States to regulate their own internal affairs."'" On the eve of the
Civil War, Lincoln stated in his First Inaugural Address, "[t]he right of each State to
order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively
is essential to the balance of power, on which the perfection and endurance of our
political fabric depends." 8" At the outset Roscoe Conkling said in the Thirty-ninth Con-
gress, "[t]he proposition to prohibit States from denying civil or political rights to any
class of persons, encounters a great objection on the threshold. It trenches upon the
principle of existing local sovereignty. It takes away a right which has been always
supposed to inhere in the States ........Other Republicans were of the same mind.
George Latham said Congress "has no right under the Constitution to interfere with the
internal policy of the several States . 788 Bingham, a leader in the Negro cause, stated
that "the care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen . . . is in the States
and not in the Federal Government. I have sought to effect no change in that respect."S7
Such sentiments were accurately summarized by a sagacious observer of the contempo-
rary scene, Justice Samuel Miller, in 1872, shortly after adoption of the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments:
we do not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy features of the
general system. Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of
the war, our statesmen have still believed that the existence of the States with
powers for domestic and local government ... was essential to the perfect
working of our complex form of government .. . . 88
" Nye, Comment on C.V. Woodward's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION
151 (H. Hyman ed. 1966).
82 C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 54, at 79.
" H. FLACK, supra note 19, at 68. Don Fernbacher observed a "widespread and tenacious
resistance to the interventionism federalism aggressively embodied." D. FERNBACHER, THE DRED
SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 581 (1978).
84 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2096 (1866). See R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 60-61.
85 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866).
88 Id. at 1295-96.
87 Id. at 1292 (emphasis added). For additional citations see R. BERGER Mira note 16 at 61-63.
88 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,82 (1872).
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Those domestic controls were safeguarded by the tenth amendment, and one who argues
for their curtailment bears the burden of persuasion.
IV. CRUEL. AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
The States' reservation of criminal law administration within their borders equally
plays no role in Cottrol's argument that the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause
struck down death penalties. Preliminarily, he emphasizes that Berger considers that the
death penalty is "appropriate and desirable as a matter of policy,"" in which he is at
odds with a leading opponent of death penalties, Hugo Bedau, who upbraids me for
lack of candor in concealing my views respecting the morality of' death penalties."
Apparently Cottrol would suggest that my alleged "policy" views, on which he dweils, 91
impeach my scholarly disinterestedness, although Bedau notes that death penalties have
been defended "by secular saints ... whose dispassionate interest in justice cannot
reasonably be challenged."92 Cottrol has yet to. learn from Cardozo that Inlot all the
precepts of conduct precious to the hearts of many of us are immutable principles of
justice Unlike Cottrol, I have not carried the banner for this or the other cause;
for forty-four years my overriding commitment has been to the integrity of the Consti-
tution.
Hamilton assured the Ratifiers of the Constitution in Federalist No. 17 that "[t]here
is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the State governments ...
the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice." 94 Consequently, to read the
"cruel and unusual" clause, adopted shortly thereafter, as depriving the States of power
to enact death penalties calls for proof. The facts are indisputably to the contrary. The
words had been borrowed from the English Bill of Rights of 1689; 95 for 100 years
thereafter both England and the colonies kept death penalties in place," evidence that
they were not deemed to constitute "cruel and unusual punishments." This is conceded:
"Iliittle in the harsh world that was eighteenth century criminal justice suggested that
the death penalty . . . was beyond the pale of what was then deemed cruel and unusual." 9 '
Cottrol also admits that there is "abundant evidence that the capital crimes of today
would survive the scrutiny of the framers," 98 and that "widespread existence of laws in
the eighteenth century prescribing death" evidences that many contemporaries of the
eighth amendment "believed the penalty necessary." 99 One might halt here, for the
established rule is that a common law term must be given its accepted meaning.'°° Chief
Justice Marshall stated that if a word was understood in a certain sense "when the
89 Cottrol, supra note 2, at 359 n.68. See also infra note 91.
9° Bedau, Berger's Defense of the Death Penalty: How Not to Read the Constitution, 81 Mimi. L. REV.
1152, 1164 (1983).
g' Cottrol, supra note 2, at 361; cf. id, at 380; see also supra note 89.
92 H. BEDAU, THE DEA'rH PENALTY 1N AMERICA 148-49 (2d ed. 1968).
gg Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
94 THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 103 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
95 2 W. & M., ch. 2 (1689).
96 R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 34-35, 44 (1982).
u Cottrol, supra note 2, at 360.
gg id. at 382.
99 Id.
1 "1:' R. BERGER, supra note 96, at 59-76.
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Constitution was framed	 . the convention must have used it in that sense." 1 °' The
common law definitions, Justice Story held, "are necessarily included as much as if they
stood in the text .. .""Y2 In fact, recognition of death penalties is writ large on the face
of the Constitution. The companion fifth amendment prohibition of the taking of life
except with due process confirms that life may be taken. So too the First Congress, which
enacted the eighth amendment, made various offenses punishable by death in the Act
of April 30, 1790, 1 ° 3 unmistakable evidence that the draftsmen did not consider "cruel
and unusual" a bar to capital punishment.
These historical facts are not disputed by Cottrol. Instead, he identifies his own
horror of death penalties with the "evolved American sense of justice." 114 But, wrote
Robert Sherrill, "[c]apital punishment is very popular all over the country."'" And
"[o]pponents of the death penalty, acknowledging the overwhelming public, political and
legal support for the death penalty, are altering their tactics, saying they expect it to be
a long time before public attitudes can be changed." 1 °6 Such facts — citations can be
multiplied — undermine Cottrol's conclusion that "[i]f the cruel and unusual punishment
clause is to have any meaning, it must take that meaning from society's changed circum-
stances, from both evolved needs and sentiments," 107 let alone that that determination is
for the people, not the courts.
Cottrol criticizes my "methodology" because it is "fundamentally at odds with beliefs,
long nurtured by the Court, of an evolving Constitution adaptable to a changing social
environment . ..." 1 " It is idle to appeal to the Court for legitimation of its challenged
practices. The question whether the Court is authorized to "adapt" the Constitution is
not answered by his assertion that the Framers were "fully mindful" that judges "likely
would shape the demands of [the cruel and unusual] clause to changing circum-
stances." 1 °9 That assertion founders on Hamilton's assurance that
[u]ntil the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or
changed the established form, it is binding ... and no presumption, or even
knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure
from it, prior to such an act. "°
'°' Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820). So deeply anchored was this
presupposition that when the Framers employed the word "treason" they defined it in order to
obviate some common-law excesses.
1°3 Ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112.
104 Cottrol, supra note 2, at 381.
Sherill, Death Row on Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983, § 6 (Magazine) at 80, col. 1. A poll
by Media General Associated Press reports that "84% of the American public currently supports
the death penalty for murder." Boston Globe, Jan, 19, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
LOS N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1985, at A13, col. 1. A "1985 California poll found 83 percent of
respondents in favor of the death penalty, with only 15 percent opposed." N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1986 at A31, col. 1. 	 •
107 Cottrol, supra note 2, at 386.
]°8 Id. at 354 (emphasis added). Justice Black dismissed "rhapsodical strains about the duty of
th[e] Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times .... The Constitution makers knew the
need for change and provided for it" by the amendment process of Article V. Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
'°° Cottrol, supra note 2, at 386.
110 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 509 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (emphasis added). In
the First Congress, Elbridge Gerry, a prominent Framer and erstwhile President of the Continental
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It is vain to invoke the fact that prior to 1787 State courts had held legislation "void, in
conflict with the state's fundamental law," that the Framers were concerned that the
legislature "would overstep its bounds," that the courts would "limit the legislative excess
that Hamilton feared."'" Were such cases in conflict with Hamilton's assurance, they
would have to yield. In fact, however, Courol proves no more than a judicial duty to
police constitutional boundaries, to check action in excess of delegated power. That furnishes
no authority for the exercise of judicial power beyond that line. Justice James lredell,
preeminent Founder, drew the distinction in Ware v. Hylton. " 2 Referring to constitutional
limitations on legislative power, he declared,
Beyond these limitations . . . their acts are void, because they are not war-
ranted by the authority given. But within them ... the Legislatures only
exercise a discretion expressly confided to them by the constitution .... It
is a discretion no more controllable . . . by a Court ... than a judicial determi-
nation is by them . . .. 113
In short, power to curb legislative excesses does not authorize a judicial takeover of
legitimate legislative, to say nothing of amendment, functions.
Next Cottrol argues that "[tjhe fourteenth amendment raises serious questions about
discriminatory application of the death penalty," and that "Berger offers a limited view
of the equal protection clause."'" That view was based on proof that: (I) the framers
refused to ban all discrimination, and (2) the equal protection clause did indeed have
"limited" goals." 5 As was said by Robert Bork:
The words are general but surely that would not permit us to escape the
framers' intent if it were dear. If the legislative history revealed a consensus
about segregation in schooling ... I do not see how the Court could escape
the choices revealed and substitute its own, even though the words are
general 'and conditions have changed." 6
Let it be assumed that "the administration of the death penalty has been rife with
discrimination," "severely tainted by racism," 17 that does not meet the proof that the
framers left criminal administration by the States untouched. Courol asserts that the
"fourteenth amendment raises serious questions about discriminatory application of the
death penalty." 18 Here as elsewhere Cottrol simply assumes, contrary to the fact, that
Congress, said, "Nile people" have directed a "particular mode for making amendments, which we
are not at liberty to depart from." A power to alter "would render the most important clause of
the Constitution nugatory." 1 ANNALS OF CoNc. 503 ( J. Gales ed. 1789). The Court itself has
rejected the notion that the Constitution may be "amended by. judicial decision without action by
the designated organs in the mode by which alone amendments can be made." McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1,36 (1892). See also Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221,227 (1920).
"' Cottrol, supra note 2, at 361-63.
12 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dalt.) 199 (1796).
" 3 Id. at 266.
" Control, supra note 2, at 360.
13 See supra text accompanying notes 45-49,54-56.
16 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some Firsl Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,13 (1971). Contrast
with this Cottrol's statement, "the amendment's general language was designed to allow for an
evolution of approach ......0ottrol, supra note 2, at 375.
Cottrol, supra note 2, at 380-381.
"A Id. at 360.
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all discrimination was banned, and makes no attempt to meet the evidence to the
contrary.
justice Powell had pointed out in Furman v. Georgia' 11 that "[t]he same discriminatory
impact argument could be made with equal force and logic with respect to those sen-
tenced to prison terms," 12° for our jails are crammed with black prisoners. He justly
observed that
[t]he root causes of the higher incidence of criminal penalties on "minorities
and the poor" will not be cured by abolishing the system of penalties . .
[M]ost of those who commit crimes happen to be underprivileged. The basic
problem results not from penalties imposed for criminal conduct but from
social and economic factors that have plagued humanity since the beginning
of recorded history ... .' 2 '
This view was adopted by the Court in Pulley v. Harris' 22 by a vote of 7 to 2, holding that
the Constitution does not require a special review to insure that a death sentence is in
line with other sentences imposed in the State for similar crimes. "Any capital sentencing
scheme," it said, "may occasionally produce aberrational outcomes."'" So it. is not Berger
alone who "rejects the view that systematic discrimination in the application of the death
penalty is proper cause for the Court's concern."'" Cottrol is free to differ with the
Court, but his failure to notice that it recently held against him marks him as a propa-
gandist rather than a scholar. His credibility is further weakened by his misleading
attempt to suggest that the materials l set forth are merely the views of Berger. "Thus
he writes, "Berger argues, the Court has severely misread public sentiment on the death
penalty." 125 When Furman was followed by "a virtual stampede of State reenactments"i 26
Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens acknowledged that "it is now evident that a large
proportion of American society continues to regard [the death penalty] as an appropriate
and necessary criminal sanction.""' And Cottrol admits that "Berger is correct in his
assertion that this action furnishes strong evidence of public support for capital punish-
ment, " 125 so that the "Berger argues" language exhibits an attempt to cast doubt on facts
that he ultimately admits.
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
r" Id. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
151 Id.
'" 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
123 Id. at 54.
'" Cottrol, .supra note 2, at 380. A striking example of Cottras own "myopia" is his comment
that "Nenefu of clergy was, despite its inherent class discrimination, one device that permitted
courts to spare lives." Id. at 382. What was this but arrant discrimination in favor of those who had
learned to read?
' 25 1d. at 361 (emphasis added).
'2s1. IAj LAN, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 65 (1980).
'" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976).
' 28 Cottrol, supra note 2, at 385. Another example of Courol's negligent misstatement: "Berger
realizes that it is perhaps too late in the constitutional day to rest a defense of the state's right to
kill on an attack on the incorporation doctrine," id. at 359, when in fact 1 devoted a chapter to that
threshold question and concluded that incorporation had no constitutional footing. R. BERGER,
supra note 96, at 10-28. It is never too late to challenge an unconstitutional doctrine. See Erie Ry.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Next Cottrol turns to "a sense of the processes the Constitution's protagonists
believed would be employed by the Court in interpreting the Constitution," 1 " which he
would derive from the objections of "Brutus," an opponent of its adoption. He recognizes
that although the objections of an opponent "cannot supply dispositive proof of legislative
intent, they are nonetheless valuable sources . [A]ssurances in meaning, are more often
than not traceable to attempts to answer charges raised by critics."'" Such was Hamilton's
response to "Brutus" in his articles on the judiciary, what Cottrol labels as "a somewhat
disingenuous attempt on Hamilton's part to make the case for the Court's powers to a
public already suspicious of the role of lawyers and courts in American society."'"
Hamilton, writes Cottrol, "was attempting to persuade opponents and the public at large
of the desirability of the new Constitution and that ... the proposed judicial branch
would not constitute a threat to the liberties of the people ...." 192
Instead of looking to "Brutus," Cottrol would have done better to study Hamilton's
"assurances," confessedly designed to sway votes for adoption. In No. 78 Hamilton wrote,
"the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments," 1 " and "next
to nothing,"'" hardly the branch to whom revision of the Constitution would be en-
trusted.'" He rejected the argument that "the courts, on the pretence of a repugnancy,
may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature."" 6
In No. 80 he advocated "an authority ... to over-rule such [state laws] as might be in
manifest contravention of the articles of union."'" In No. 81 he rejected the argument
that the Court would be given a power of construing laws "according to the spirit of the
Constitution" which would enable it "to mould them into whatever shape it may think
proper . . . ."'" And he declared that "judiciary encroachments on the legislative au-
thority" would be checked by "the power of instituting impeachments."'" Cottrol agrees
that Hamilton "expressed the view that the Court should be bound to adhere strictly to
the law without substituting the private predilictions of justices for the demands of the
law." 14° He thinks to dispose of Hamilton by labelling him "disingenuous." Hamilton's
"suspicious" listeners were not required to psychoanalyze his motives; "disingenuous" or
not, his assurances could be taken at face value. To repudiate such representations,
wrote Justice Story, would constitute a "fraud" on the people."'
Cottrol further argues that "the original understanding of the Constitution included
an ability to exercise common-law reasoning processes," and "to use familiar tools of
Cottrol, supra note 2, at 361 (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 362.
131 Id. at 363.
"2 1d.
133 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lih. ed. 1937).
" 4 Id. at 504 n.*, (quoting C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS vol. 1, at 186 (1748)).
135 Because of colonial experience judges were viewed with "aversion and distrust," so that
Justice James Wilson, a leading Framer, counseled in 1791 that it "is high time that we should
chastise our prejudices." 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 292 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
196 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 133, at 507 (emphasis added).
: 37 Id. No. 80 at 516 (emphasis added).
"8 Id. No. 81 at 523-24.
139 M. at 526.
' 4° Cottrol, supra note 2, at 363.
14 ' "If the Constitution was ratified under the belief sedulously propagated on all sides, that
such protection was afforded, would it not now be a fraud upon the whole people to give a different
construction to its power?" 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1084 (5th ed. 1905).
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judicial reasoning." 142 Yet this champion of the "familiar tools" ignores the centuries-old
rule that common-law terms are to be given the content they had at common law, 14 :1 e.g.,
death penalties were not within the compass of "cruel and unusual punishments." And
he ignores another "common-law" canon, going back at least to Francis Bacon and
reiterated by Justice James Wilson, that the duty of the courts is to construe, not to
make, law.'" Then too, the 1787 Framers had rejected judicial participation in a Council
of Revision that would advise the President in exercising the veto of legislation on the
ground that judges had no special competence to deal with policy matters. 145 This
rejection, Edward Corwin concluded, proceeded from the principle that "the power of
making ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding the laws."L 46 Throughout the
several conventions, judicial review was constantly couched in terms of expounding,
never of making, the law.' 47 Again, Cottrol asserts that the Constitution "left room for
judicial discretion, for adapting law to . changing circumstances,"" 8 when in fact the
Founders had "a profound fear of judicial independence and discretion."" 9
He considers that both Marbury v. Madison ' 5° and McCulloch v. Maryland' 51 exemplify
"a flexible view of the Constitution and the Court's interpretive authority . ."'" Marbury
invalidated Congress' attempt to enlarge the Court's "original jurisdiction," an effort
that should have engaged its sympathy and more "flexible" response. McCulloch, Marshall
underscored, did not in the slightest degree claim power to expand federal jurisdiction;
and he categorically stated that the courts had no "right to change that instrument."'"
It is indeed necessary to recognize that "common-law processes are inherent in consti-
tutional interpretation,"E" but Cottrol would pick and choose among them. He acknowl-
edges "that a too pliable Constitution is no constitution at all . :955 Certainly the
Cottrol, supra note 2, at 363. See also id. at 387.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 100-102.
144 F. BACON, SELECTED WRITINGS 138 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1955). Justice Wilson wrote that the judge
"will remember, that his duty and his business is, not to make the law, but to interpret and apply
it." 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 502 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). See also Minor v. Happersett, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 162,178 (1874); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1,41 (1849).
'" 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 73 (1911); 1 id. at 97-98.
146 E. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 42 (1914).
1 ' i7 See R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT index "expounding" (1969). In Kamper
v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Gas.) 20,47 (1793), a landmark assertion of the power of judicial review,
Judge Henry stated: "The judiciary from the nature of the office ... could never be designed to
determine upon the equity, necessity, or usefulness of a law .... il\flot being chosen immediately
by the people, nor being accountable to them ... they do not, and ought not, to represent the
people in framing or repealing any law."
1" Cottrol, supra note 2, at 362.
149 G. Woou, THE. CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 298 (1969); see also id, at
304. Judge William Cranch of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia stated in the preface
to the first volume of the Supreme Court's decisions that '10 a government which is emphatically
stiled a government of laws, the least possible range ought to be left for the discretion of the judge."
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii (1803). Without the common law, Chancellor Kent declared, "the courts would
be left to a dangerous discretion, and to roam at large in the trackless field of their own imagina-
tions." 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 373 (9th ed. 1858).
1 " 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
151 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Cottrol, supra note 2, at 364.
1 " R. BERGER, supra note 16, at 377.
154 Cottrol, supra note 2, at 387.
155 Id.
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Framers never contemplated that those processes could do "violence to the framers'
intentions." 155 Mark Tushnet, Cottrol's counsellor,'' 7 considers the view that "we are
indeed better off being bound by the dead hand of the past than in being subjected to
the whims of willful judges trying to make the Constitution live" must be considered
"fairly powerful." 158
Turning to the fourteenth amendment, Cottrol considers that its framers contem-
plated that courts "would fashion constitutional doctrine," and that they "would develop
doctrine, informed but not shackled by the necessarily narrow focuses of the drafters." 159
He is intoxicated by his own rhetoric. In fact, courts were in very ill repute because of
the Dred Scottio decision, detestation of which still ran high.'" Distrust of the Court 182
accounts for the fact that enforcement of the fourteenth amendment was entrusted by
section 5 to Congress, not the Court. 163 Bingham complained that of late the Court "had
'dared to descend from its high place in the discussion and decision of purely judicial
questions to the settlement of political questions which it has no more right to decide for the
American people than has the Court of St. Petersburg.'"' 64 Suffrage and segregation
were precisely such political decisions as the framers did not mean to leave to the Court;
and they did not scruple to withdraw one "political" case from the bosom of the Court
in Ex parte McCardle. 1 "
The "original intention" of the Framers is at the heart of the ongoing debate as to
the judicial role, and on that issue Cottrol lapses into utter confusion. He declares that
"the intentions of original framers must be given clue effect";' 68 presumably "due" is the
joker which enables him to argue that the courts may "develop doctrine, informed but
not shackled by the necessarily narrow focuses of the drafters."'"' Nevertheless, he
opines, "the Court's thwarting of [the framers'] fundamental intentions" is not -"justi-
156 Id. '
157 Id. at 353 n.*.
I" Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARV. L. REV. 781, 787 (1983).
159 Cottrol, supra one 2, at 365, 354-55.
I Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
' 6 ' Senator Sumner even sought to bar the placement of Chief Justice Taney's bust in the
Supreme Court Chamber — the customary memorial — and insisted that his name should be
"hooted down in the pages of history." D. DONALD, supra note 56, at 193. In the House, Stevens
condemned "the infamous sentiment that damned the late Chief Justice to everlasting fame: and,
1 fear, to everlasting lire." COLIC. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 75 (1865). Of Dred Scott, Senator
Jacob Howard, a participant in the debates of the 39th Congress, said in 1870, "It was a partisan,
political decision, the purpose of which was to establish by judicial decision ... for all time to come
the legality, the rightfulness, and even the piety of slavery .... The comment made upon that great
wrongful judicial decision is to be seen in the dreadful war through which we have passed ."
CONG. GLOBE, 41st. Cong., 2d Sess. 1543 (1870).
1 " "The Radicals did not trust the judiciary in general and the Supreme Court in particular
„ „" R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 53-54 (1960). "Radical Republicans sought to deny the
postwar Court the power to review congressional Reconstruction." M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE
73 (1977).
'" See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
'" 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 462 (1971) (emphasis
added).
"i5 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). See R. BERGER, supra note 96, at 169 n.65.
1 " Cottrol, supra note 2, at 354.
157 Id. at 354-55.
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fled."'" Even so, he complains that "Berger would limit the Court's eighth amendment
analysis to the sensibilities of the franiers."' 69 Cottrol argues that:
[t]o give full effect to the intentions of the framers of the fourteenth amendment,
the Court must go beyond the details of whether or not the amendment was
specifically designed to confer this right or protect that privilege and inquire
into whether or not a state's practice is inconsistent with the concepts of
citizenship and equal protection that were the central concern of those who
authored the constitutional revolution in race relations and federalism in the
years following the Civil War. 06
Is the framers' exclusion of suffrage and segregation from the amendment a mere
"detail" or a "fundamental intention" that is not to be "thwarted"? Bickel wrote that
"[t]he Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly rejected the option of an open-
ended grant of power to Congress freely to meddle with the conditions within the States,
so as to render them equal in accordance with Congress's own notions." 37 ' Still less was
that option given to the Court.
But. Berger, Cottrol relents, plays "an important role ... in reminding an all too
often result-oriented bench, bar, and public of the need to retain continuity with original
intentions." 172 The problem, as he sees it, is "to develop limits that prevent those [com-
mon-law] processes from doing violence to the framers' intentions."'" The Court's
unremitting expansion of its law making and constitutional revision makes a call for its
development of "limits" delusory. To expect "self-restraint" from the Court is like asking
a greyhound not to take out after a rabbit. "The inability of any of the noninterpretivist
philosophies to control the judge," Judge Robert Bork observes, "to prevent him or her
from imposing merely personal or class-bound sympathies as the fundamental and
unchallengeable law of the nation, is certainly a flaw so damaging as to be classified
fatal." 1 • Until activists set out to bolster the decisions of the Warren Court, 'there was
never any doubt that the document was to be construed so as to give effect, as nearly as
possible, to the intentions of those who made it." 1 " Let me counsel Cottrol to study and
ponder on Judge Bork's Foreword. 176
,65 Id. at 365.
'69 Id. at 381.
17" Id, at 375 (emphasis added).
" 1 A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME. COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 48 (1978).
172 Cottrol, supra note 2, at 386.
172 Id. at 387.
174 Bork, Foreword to G. MCDOWELI„ THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY at viii (1985).
175 Id. at v. The Court has "uninterruptedly" turned to the original intention. tenBroek, Use by
the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of .
Constitutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 399, 399 (1939). Henry Monaghan insists that "any
theory of constitutional interpretation which renders unimportant or irrelevant questions as to the
original intent, so far as that intent can be fairly discerned, is not, given our tradition, politically or
intellectually defensible." Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.—C.L. L. REV.
117, 124 (1978). Respect for the original intention is deeply rooted in the common law and in our
history. Berger, Original Intention In Historical Perspective, 54 GEO, WASH. L. REV. 101 (1986).
176 See supra note 174.
